Abstract
Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems consist of tags, readers and a database, as depicted in Figure 1. As the tag is small enough to be implanted into almost any item, and the data on the tag can be read wirelessly, RFID technology has proven useful in many situations including stock control, payment and identification systems. However, as RFID tags cannot be switched off and will answer any request without asking for the agreement of their bearer they have raised new security concerns. For instance, can a person's movements be traced using the RFID tags implanted in the items they are carrying? As early RFID tags responded to any signal broadcast to them and replied with a unique identifier (as depicted in Figure 2 ), Benetton's proposal to place RFID tags in clothes caused a public outcry for precisely this reason [5] . Similar traceability concern have also affected the New York area E-Zpass system [9] .
There has been a lot of work on checking the security and authenticity properties of RFID protocols * This work has been partially supported by the EPSRC project Verifying Interoperability Requirements in Pervasive Systems (EP/F033540/1) Suppose now that the tag encrypts its ID with a key shared between the tag and the reader; the ID would be be kept secure. However, if the encryption is deterministic the message is the same each time and the attacker can trace the tag by simply looking for this bit string. Traceability is a threat that is particularly relevant to RFID protocols because RFID tags are the only technology that people regularly carry on their person and cannot turn off. Such security threats have led to the development of RFID tags that encrypt their communication and authenticate the readers, such as the protocols used in the e-passport [11] and on transit system payment cards. However, even these protocols often turn out to be broken (such as the Mifare classic tag used for the London Underground [13] ) or allow the user to be tracked (such as the Nike+iPod sports kit [17] ). This shows the need for methods of checking the correctness of RFID protocols before they are implemented.
The aim of our work is to aid in the checking of RFID protocols for traceability attacks. We identify two levels of untraceability. Strong untraceability holds if an attacker cannot tell the difference between an RFID system in which all tags are different and a system in which some tags appear twice. Weak untraceability holds if an attacker cannot identify two particular runs of a protocol as having involved the same tag. Intuitively, an attacker learns nothing from a strongly untraceable system, whereas the attacker in a weakly untraceable system may learn some information about the tags but still cannot trace one particular tag.
We formalise our notions of strong and weak untraceability by defining them using observational equivalence in the applied pi-calculus [2] . This makes the definitions absolutely precise and in some cases allows a user to automatically check that a protocol is untraceable using the tool ProVerif [6] .
In the next section we briefly describe the applied pi-calculus. We describe how RFID systems can be modelled in Section 3. Our main definitions of strong and weak untraceability are defined in Section 4. Finally we conclude and discuss further work in Section 5.
Related work While a number of papers discuss the privacy problems raised by RFID techonologies (see for example [14, 15, 20] ), very few precisely define what they mean by untraceability. Avoine et al. in [4] were the firsts to give a formal definition of untraceability. Some other attempts to formalize untraceability then followed [3, 8, 16, 19] . All this work however is carried out in the computational model, which is poorly supported by automatic tools. The advantage of our work is that it is carried out in the symbolic setting which is supported, as already mentioned, by the ProVerif tool. These two settings being very different, it is difficult at this stage to compare our work with the ones mentioned before.
In the symbolic world, Deursen et al. [18] are, to the best of our knowledge, the only other people to define untraceability. They propose a formal definition of untraceability in a particular trace model. Their definition is similar to our definition of weak untraceability. However, the model they use to defined this property does not lend itself to automation, which is the main advantage of working in the symbolic setting instead of the computational.
The applied pi-calculus
The applied pi-calculus [2] is a language for describing concurrent processes and their interactions. It is based on the pi-calculus, but adds equations which make it possible to model a range of cryptographic primitives. Properties of processes described in the applied pi-calculus can be proved by employing manual techniques [2] , or by automated tools such as ProVerif [6] . As well as reachability properties which are typical of model checking tools, ProVerif can in some cases prove that processes are observationally equivalent [7] . This capability is important for privacytype properties such as those we study here. The applied pi-calculus has been used to study a variety of security protocols, such as those for private authentication [12] and for key establishment [1] .
To describe processes in the applied pi-calculus, one starts with a set of names (which are used to name communication channels or other constants), a set of variables, and a signature Σ which consists of the function symbols which will be used to define terms. In the case of security protocols, typical function symbols will include pbk for constructing the public key pbk(k) associated to the secret key k, and aenc for asymmetric encryption, which takes a plaintext and a public key and returns the corresponding ciphertext, and adec for asymmetric decryption, taking a ciphertext and the corresponding private key and returning the plaintext. One can also describe the equations which hold on terms constructed from the signature. For example in the signature Σ = {pair, π 1 , π 2 , pbk, aenc, adec} pbk, aenc, and adec are as described above, and pair is the function symbol that denotes the concatenation operation. π 1 and π 2 are respectively the projections on the first and second component of a pair. It is usual to consider for Σ the following equational theory
Terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other terms. Plain processes are built up in a similar way to processes in the pi calculus, except that messages can contain terms (rather than just names). In the grammar described below, M and N are terms, n is a name, x a variable and u is a metavariable, standing either for a name or a variable.
Example Consider the following process System:
The first component sends a W elcome message to the second, and waits for the second to identify itself by sending its id. Accordingly the second component waits for a W elcome message and identifies itself.
The operational semantics of processes in the applied pi-calculus is defined by structural rules defining two relations: structural equivalence, written ≡ and internal reduction, written →. Structural equivalence is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed under α-conversion on names and variables, by application of evaluation contexts −an evaluation context is an extended process with a hole instead of some extended process− and satisfying some further basic structural rules such as A | 0 ≡ A, associativity and commutativity of |, etc. Internal reduction → is the smallest relation on extended processes closed under structural equivalence and application of evaluation contexts such that out(a, x).P | in(a, x).Q → P | Q, and for any ground terms M and N , whenever
Applied pi-calculus processes evolve by executing the actions mentioned above. We write A → A to mean that process A evolves to A by one step, and A → * A for finitely many steps. Example Consider process P described in the previous example. We have
This internal reduction expresses a communication on the channel c between the two components of the process P . In the reminder of the process y is replaced by W elcome.
Many properties of security protocols (including the properties we study in this paper) are formalised in terms of observational equivalence (≈) between two processes. Intuitively, processes which are observationally equivalent cannot be distinguished by an outside observer, no matter what sort of test he makes. This is formalised by saying that the processes are indistinguishable under any context, i.e., no matter in what environment they are executed.
Example Consider the following three processes P 1 , P 2 , and P 3 :
Since an outside observer doesn't know the decryption key k, he cannot ditsinguish if it is the constant a or the pair pair(a, b) which is encrypted in P 1 and P 2 respectively. We thus have that P 1 ≈ P 2 . On the other hand, P 1 ≈ P 3 , since the test • | in(c, x). if π 2 (x) = b then out(c, "success") distinguishes the two processes, i.e., the observer can tell the processes apart by testing if the second component of the output message is b.
Advantages and limitations of the applied picalculus An advantage of the applied pi-calculus is that we can combine powerful (hand) proof techniques from the applied pi-calculus with automated proofs provided by Blanchet's ProVerif tool. Moreover, the verification is not restricted to a bounded number of sessions and we do not need to explicitly define the adversary. We only give the equational theory describing the intruder. Generally, the intruder has access to any message sent on public, i.e., unrestricted channels. These public channels model the network. Note that all channels are anonymous in the applied pi-calculus. Unless the identity or something like the IP address is specified explicitly in the conveyed message, the origin of a message is unknown. This abstraction of a real protocol is very appealing, as it avoids the need to model explicitly an anonymiser service. However, we stress that a real implementation needs to treat anonymous channels with care. Another advantage of the applied pi-calculus is its ability to model sophisticated cryptographic primitives by means of the equational theory. One limitation concerns modelling non-determinism or probabilities, e.g. MIX-nets [10] . In the applied pi calculus, all non-determinism is controlled by the attacker. If MIX-nets are modelled non-deterministically, this gives the attacker unreasonably strong powers.
Modelling protocols
In this work, we do not consider all the processes of the applied pi-calculus. We thus first need to define which processes correspond to the RFID protocols 1 we have considered.
Definition 1 An RFID protocol P is a closed plain process such that
where T ≡ νm. init. !main for some processes init and main. Moreover, we consider P such that all channels occurring in it are ground, and private channels are never sent on any channel.
As we mentioned in the introduction, a system P is formed of readers (R), tag (T ), and a database (DB). Intuitively, T is the process modelling one tag, and having T under a replication in P corresponds to considering a system with an unbounded number of tag. Each tag, initialises itself (this includes registering to the database DB and is modelled by init in T ) and then may execute itself an unbounded number of times. Thus main models one session of the tag's protocol. R corresponds to one session of the reader's protocol, and DB to the database. We consider an unbounded number of readers, thus R is under a replication in P . 
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
The reader continuously emits a welcome message and expects from a tag to answer with its identity T paired 1 RFID protocols only differ from usual protocols like the Needham-Schroeder protocol in the number of roles. We presently restrict ourselves to RFID protocols because traceability is particularly relevant to them. Although our definitions could be extended to k-party protocols for any k.
with a fresh nonce N , the whole asymmetrically encrypted with the reader's public key pbk(R). Moreover, the reader may (but not necessarily) send some message (lets say 0) to the database if it has seen two particular tags more then three times each. Although the reader's behaviour is somehow odd and the protocol doesn't satisfy important properties like authentication (it is subject to replay attacks), it is still (as we will see later) an interesting candidate for us. It will allow us to separate weak from strong untraceability. We thus start by modelling it in the applied pi-calculus. For this, we consider the signature Σ and the equational theory given in the first example of Section 2
Here, init = 0 and main = νn. in(c, x). if (x = W elcome) then out(c, aenc(pair(id, n), pbk(k))). In order to reduce the notational clutter we have introduced the following notation:
Moreover, the condition {h, i, j, , m, n} = {1, . . . , 6} expresses that we consider all the permutations for the values of h, i, j, , m, and n.
Formalising untraceability

Strong untraceability
Untraceability is sometimes defined as ensuring that an intruder tampering with the system thinks that each tag session is initiated by a different tag.
Definition 2
Let P be an RFID protocol. Let
where T ≡ νm. init. main P preserves strong untraceability for tags if
The intuitive idea behind this definition is as follows: each session of P should look to the intruder as if it was initiated by a different tag. In other words, an ideal version of the protocol, w.r.t. untraceability, would allow tags to execute themselves at most once. The intruder should then not be able to tell the difference between the protocol P and the ideal version of P .
Weak untraceability
Let P be an RFID protocol. Informally, weak untraceability ensures that a tag can execute its protocol multiple times without an intruder being able to link these executions together (ISO 15408 definition). To formally define this in the applied pi calculus, we first need to define tagging the outputs of a process with a term.
Definition 3
Let P be a process such that all channels that appear in P are ground and let C pub be the set of public channels appearing in P . Tagging the public outputs of P with N results in the process P N = tag(P, N, C pub ) with
Example If we consider the process System given as an example in Section 2. Tagging its public outputs with the constant n results in the following process
then out(c, pair(id, n))) Definition 4 Let P be an RFID protocol. From P we build the two following processes
where T 1 and T 2 are the processes modelling two tag such that
where T 1 and T 2 are the processes modelling two tags such that
We consider s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 to be three distinct session identifiers that do not occur in P (i.e. three distinct public constants not appearing in P ). P preserves weak untraceability for tags if
The intuitive idea behind this definition is as follows: if a protocol satisfies untraceability, then an intruder shouldn't be able to tell the difference when two sessions s 1 and s 2 are executed by the same tag in the process P 1 sessions s 1 and s 2 are initiated by the tag T 1 ), or by two different tags (in the process P 2 sessions s 1 and s 2 are imitated by the tags T 1 and T 2 respectively).
Strong untraceability Weak untraceability?
Let's consider again our toy protocol. This protocol satisfies weak but not strong untraceability. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that when an outside observer sees a message output on channel db, he knows that there are two tags that have executed themselves three times each and thus that it is not the case that each tag executes itself at most once. He can hence distinguish the actual protocol from its ideal version, violating the definition of strong untraceability. On the other hand this information doesn't allow him to really link two sessions of the same tag.
More formally, if we consider the evaluation context C[•] = •, then in P the reader may emit a sound (i.e. a message on channel beep) according to the protocol. However, in the ideal version P this will never happen since tags execute their protocol only once. Nevertheless, we formally proved using ProVerif that this protocol satisfies weak untraceability.
Conclusion
The main contribution of the paper is two definitions of untraceability in the applied pi-calculus. These definitions can be used to automatically verify (with ProVerif) RFID protocols. We also proved that these two definitions are not equivalent by building an RFID protocol that is weakly untraceable but not strongly untraceable. Moreover, we proved that this protocol is weakly untraceable using the ProVerif tool, demonstrating that this definition can be suitable for automatic verification.
The next step for us, is to test our definitions on existing protocols, academic ones as well as real ones. We are planing amongst others to verify w.r.t. untraceability the protocols used in the e-passport. As much as possible, we will do so using the ProVerif tool, in order to conclude to the suitability of our definitions to automation.
In this paper, we conjecture that strong untraceability implies weak untraceability. We would now want to prove this formally. We will then look at untraceability of corrupted tags (namely backward and foraward untraceability). Moreover, untraceability is closely related to anonymity. In particular, one would expect that untraceability implies anonymity. This is something we would like to look at in the future.
